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The genesis of Canadian naval aviation can be traced to the 
difficulties the Royal Canadian Navy 
(RCN) encountered in its battle 
for the convoys during 1942. The 
shortcomings of the service’s modest, 
hastily constructed and ill-equipped 
escorts sharpened the naval staff’s 
determination to develop a fleet 
of substantial warships, in which 
aircraft carriers would be an essential 
element. The birth of the RCN’s air 
arm came about as a result of the 
efforts of a handful of Canadian 
officers who recognized the value of 
naval air power to the prosecution 
of the war.1
 During the Second World War 
anti-submarine operations became 
a top Allied priority demanding 
massive resources that had been 
entirely unanticipated prior to 1940. 
In less than three years the RCN, 
which had only 3,500 personnel 
and six ocean-going warships in 
September 1939, mushroomed in 
size to fill this gap in British and 
American preparations and became 
a major ocean-going fleet. However, 
most of the Navy’s more than two 
hundred ocean-going anti-submarine 
escorts were emergency-built, single-
purpose types, whose designs 
incorporated many compromises 
for quick construction; they were, in 
fact, intended for early disposal from 
military service as soon as the war 
was over. This was no way to build a 
service that would endure in the post-
war period. The Navy wanted bigger 
and more diverse ships that together 
would make a “balanced” fleet 
capable of carrying out a wide range 
of operations, either independently or 
as a significant component of an allied 
combination. It was for this reason 
that during the war the RCN, even 
while rushing large numbers of anti-
submarine escorts into service, also 
exerted generally effective pressure 
on the government to acquire larger, 
more sophisticated warships such as 
Tribal-class destroyers, cruisers, and 
aircraft carriers.2 
 The importance of naval air 
power was driven home by the 
success of the Royal and US Navy’s 
specialized anti-submarine escort 
aircraft carriers against German 
U-boats in 1943 soon after the poor 
showing of Canadian escort groups 
resulted in their withdrawal from the 
transatlantic run in early months of 
that year for upgrades in equipment 
and training. In fact, the British 
surface groups that replaced them 
had equal difficulty against the 
massed U-boat “packs” in the central 
ocean, underscoring the need for 
escort carrier support, especially in 
the “air gap” south of Greenland that 
was beyond the range of most land-
based maritime patrol aircraft.
 The origin of the escort carrier was 
a response to the initial deployment 
of U-boats in large groups or “packs,” 
and the use by the Germans of 
long-range air reconnaissance, in 
late 1940 and 1941 in order to catch 
convoys far out at sea, beyond the 
reach of the bulk of the surface and 
air escort forces then available. By 
December 1941, the Royal Navy 
(RN) had a modest force of four 
armoured and four unarmoured 
aircraft carriers, and only one more 
of each was expected to be completed 
by 1946. This was something like 
the bare minimum or less needed 
for operations by the main fleet. In 
order to provide air support for trade 
convoys, and also for amphibious 
operations to land army forces – 
another new requirement that could 
not have been foreseen prior to the 
defeat of France in 1940 and Britain’s 
ejection from continental Europe – it 
was estimated that the RN needed 
Abstract: The Royal Canadian Navy 
provided much of the crew for the 
British escort carrier HMS Nabob, 
both to relieve a manpower shortage 
in the Royal Navy and to give Canadian 
personnel experience in operating 
aircraft carriers. Nabob’s Canadian 
crew achieved these goals. They 
operated the ship in two major British 
fleet actions, and through outstanding 
damage control saved the ship after 
she was severely damaged by a U-boat 
attack.
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434 additional carriers as soon as 
possible. To make up the shortfall 
in numbers it was necessary to 
convert large merchant ships, built or 
building, by installing a flying deck 
on top of the hull. In the event, the 
shipbuilding program undertaken by 
the US to supply merchant ships to 
Britain under “Lend-Lease” proved 
to be the major source of hulls for the 
RN’s escort carriers.3
 The RCN took the first tentative 
steps toward the establishment of its 
own naval air branch in early 1943, 
when Rear-Admiral G.C. Jones, 
vice-chief of the naval staff, advised 
the chief of the naval staff (CNS), 
Vice-Admiral P.W. Nelles, that both 
the director of operations division, 
Captain H.N. Lay, and the director of 
plans division, Captain H.G. DeWolf, 
“should examine and report on what 
practical steps the Royal Canadian 
Navy can take in this matter.”4 
Further impetus came from the allied 
Atlantic Convoy Conference held in 
Washington in March 1943 to find 
means of countering the success of 
the mid-ocean U-boat operations. 
The conference underscored the 
importance of air support to surface 
escorts, and recognized Canada as a 
full partner in the Atlantic battle.
  Equally important in progress 
of Canadian plans for naval aviation 
was Britain’s manpower crisis, which 
paved the way for the RCN to crew 
British escort carriers. Soon after the 
Atlantic Convoy Conference, and 
sooner than anyone had expected, 
the worst crisis in the Atlantic 
passed. On 30 October 1943, the 
Admiralty announced its intention 
to cut down its escort building 
program. Soon after, Admiral Sir 
Andrew Cunningham, first sea lord, 
appealed to the Canadian chief of the 
naval staff for additional assistance 
with manning beyond what had 
been already agreed at the first 
Quebec Conference in August 1943 
(the latter was a summit between 
President Franklin Roosevelt and 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
during which the Canadian services 
took the opportunity to liaise with 
senior British and American staffs). 
Before responding to the Admiralty’s 
request, Naval Service Headquarters 
(NSHQ) sent Captain W.B. Creery, 
assistant chief of the naval staff 
(ACNS), to London to discuss the 
matter with Admiralty officials. With 
the information Creery obtained, the 
staff in Ottawa agreed that Canada 
would follow Britain’s lead and 
reduce both the frigate and corvette 
construction programs in order 
to release personnel for manning 
additional RN warships. The specific 
proposals called for the RCN to take 
over ten frigates and two escort 
carriers.5 
 HMS Nabob6 (CVE 41 – the former 
USS Edisto Bay), the first carrier 
slated for crewing by the RCN, 
was commissioned into the Royal 
Navy on 7 September 1943, as she 
lay alongside the fitting-out wharf 
of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding 
Company at Seattle, Washington. 
Having completed with stores, and 
manned by a skeleton Royal Navy 
crew, Nabob steamed to Vancouver, 
British Columbia, for modification to 
Royal Navy standards. On 15 October 
1943, Captain H.N. Lay, RCN, took 
command and Canadian personnel 
began to join the ship.
 The work carried out at Vancouver 
on Nabob and other American-built 
escort carriers delivered to the RN 
was the result of contention between 
HMS Nabob – a Royal Navy escort carrier 
crewed largely by Canadian personnel.
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5the two senior allied navies. On 
27 March 1943 the escort carrier 
HMS Dasher sank with heavy loss 
of life as the result of an explosion 
below decks as 891 Squadron’s 
Fairey Swordfish aircraft were being 
refuelled. The Admiralty board of 
enquiry attributed the explosion to 
a leaking valve, badly sited below 
a mess deck in the petrol control 
department, which was touched off 
by a carelessly dropped cigarette. 
The RN blamed American safety 
arrangements which were, they said, 
“by our standards practically non-
existent.” American experts blamed 
British inexperience with the fuel 
safety arrangement, in which carbon-
dioxide was pumped through the 
system to purge it. Regardless, “the 
obvious presence of persistent and 
widespread petrol vapour below 
decks was a feature of these early 
ships and was well-known to those 
on board who took it for granted 
that a torpedo hit would explode 
the petrol and blow their ‘floating 
petrol can’ apart instantly. The 
volatile high octane was carried 
in compartments not designed for 
it...”7 Consequently, the Admiralty 
decided that fuel storage would 
be reduced to about a quarter 
(22,500 gallons) of that originally 
provided and that the standard 
fleet-carrier system of separate 
cylindrical gasoline tanks would 
be fitted into its escort carriers.8
 Other modifications included 
adding another 1,200 to 2,000 tons 
of ballast to increase stability. The 
Admiralty did not countenance 
the American method of achieving 
stability by pumping salt water 
into empty fuel tanks. In addition 
to the extra ballast added to each 
escort carrier, buoyancy drums 
were fitted over the ballast in the 
wing deep tanks to reduce the list 
after a torpedo hit; the Admiralty 
also originated the system of 
bomb-magazine wing bulkheads, 
keeping weapons more than ten to 
15 feet from the ship’s side.9 Both 
of these latter modifications would 
play an important role in saving HMS 
Nabob as we shall see later.
 Finally, American-built escort 
carriers had their flight decks 
lengthened by 42 feet to operate 
British aircraft “which could not use 
the American catapults and perhaps, 
like the Swordfish, needed a longer 
take-off run when fully loaded than 
the original deck provided.”10
 The RCN was particularly 
anxious to man the two British 
escort carriers as quickly as possible. 
In an effort to reduce the delays 
in the conversion program the 
Canadian government offered “to 
do the anglicizing modifications at 
their own expense,” and placed the 
work with the shipbuilding firm of 
Burrard Drydock and Shipbuilding 
Company in  Vancouver .  The 
alterations carried out by Burrards 
did not include the modifications to 
enable the ship also to serve as an 
assault carrier in support of landing 
operations. The extensive work 
involved in this further conversion, 
which included the installation of 
an operational telephone system, a 
new briefing room, an army plot, 
extra cabins and bunks, was done 
the following spring, in April 1944, in 
the United Kingdom by the Caledon 
Shipbuilding Company at Dundee.11
 By 28 December 1943,  the 
Canadian portion of HMS Nabob’s 
complement had all joined the 
carrier.12 Early in January of 1944, 
Nabob embarked fuel, ammunition 
and stores in preparation for her 
working up trials scheduled for 12 
January. The trials proceed smoothly 
until 25 January when the carrier ran 
aground near the mouth of the Fraser 
River, in the Strait of Georgia, while 
steaming at full speed into the wind 
as she prepared to land on the first 
of the Grumman Avenger torpedo 
bombers of the Royal Navy’s 805 
Squadron. The aircraft was hurriedly 
waved off, and frantic efforts were 
made to refloat the ship by going 
full astern for a period of five to 
ten minutes, but to no avail.13 A 
number of vessels were soon on 
the scene to render assistance, 
including another escort carrier, 
HMS Ranee, and HMC Ships 
Armentieres and Haro. The first 
attempt to pull Nabob off the 
sandbank was made at high water 
on the morning of 26 January, with 
Ranee secured astern, Armentieres 
on the starboard quarter, and Haro 
on the port. The operation failed. 
A second attempt was made later 
that day after the carrier had been 
lightened by pumping out some 
300 tons of oil fuel and 700 tons 
of salt water from the fuel tanks. 
It too failed.14
 After two days, Nabob  had 
been lightened by some 3,202 
tons; dredging operations had 
been completed and with the 
assistance of two tugs she was 
finally refloated. Once clear of 
the sandbank the carrier shaped 
a course under her own power 
for Burrard Drydock located in 
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As the director of the Royal Canadian 
Navy’s operations division Captain Horatio 
Nelson Lay, RCN, helped to shape the RCN’s 
establishment of a naval air branch and 
would later command HMS Nabob.
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6Above: HMS Nabob photographed on the morning of 25 January 1944 
making good speed through the Strait of Georgia.
Below: Later that day Nabob ran hard aground on Roberts Bank at the 
mouth of the Fraser River south of Vancouver, British Columbia. The 
carrier had been steaming at full speed into the wind as it prepared 
to take on board the Grumman Avengers of 805 Squadron. In the 
background can be seen another escort carrier, HMS Ranee, which 
was sent to help. Nabob was finally refloated after two days of effort.
Left: A Grumman Avenger torpedo bomber from HMS Nabob.
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7North Vancouver for an examination 
of her hull. Fortunately, no damage 
had been sustained as a result of the 
grounding, and the re-embarkation 
of stores began again. Nabob departed 
Burrard drydock on 1 February 1944, 
resumed work-ups for the next few 
days, and on 7 February sailed for San 
Francisco and active duty.15
 Upon arrival at San Francisco 
the Royal Navy’s 852 Squadron of 12 
Grumman Avenger bombing aircraft 
was embarked by crane.16 Aircrew 
and maintenance personnel – all 
Royal Navy – also joined at that time. 
Nabob was now fully manned. The 
crew, with the squadrons embarked, 
comprised 504 RCN who were 
mainly responsible for operating 
the ship, and 327 RN, and nine 
Royal New Zealand Navy personnel, 
who mainly comprised the aviation 
organization. In mid-February, the 
carrier set sail for San Diego the next 
port of call, with the US destroyer 
Ballard acting as plane guard and the 
airship K-115 providing air support 
for the passage. While en route Nabob 
carried out flying trials. The first day 
of exercises was marred by the loss 
of one aircraft which ditched into 
the sea after take-off. Fortunately, 
the airship was quick to respond and 
dropped an inflatable life raft for the 
pilot, who was subsequently picked 
up by Ballard’s motor boat.17 
 Two days later, on 17 February 
1944, the carrier berthed at United 
States Naval Air Station North Island, 
San Diego, and for the next three 
days conducted local exercises. 
Her exercises were cut short when 
a signal was received ordering the 
carrier to rendezvous with the escort 
carrier HMS Empress and proceed to 
Norfolk, Virginia. However, owing 
to mechanical difficulties, Empress 
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An Avenger torpedo bomber lands on the 
deck of HMS Nabob.
could not undertake the passage 
and Nabob was ordered to proceed 
independently. Three days out the 
Halifax-bound frigate HMCS New 
Waterford joined as plane guard, and 
the two ships passed through the 
Panama Canal. On the next leg of the 
voyage Nabob maintained an anti-
submarine patrol as U-boats had been 
reported in the area. Having detached 
the frigate for Halifax, Nabob secured 
in Norfolk on 8 March for a short refit. 
The carrier remained in the Norfolk 
Navy Yard for ten days undergoing 
repairs to the echo sounder, an 
ammeter on the diesel switchboard 
and the replacement of the screw 
which had been whistling – probably 
due to cavitation. In addition, three 
damaged Avenger aircraft were 
replaced by three new machines.18
 While the carrier was undergoing 
repairs, Lay paid a visit to the 
British Admiralty Maintenance 
Representative in Washington, D.C., 
and to Naval Service Headquarters 
in Ottawa, in order to rectify certain 
problems of pay and amenities 
that were undermining the ship’s 
company’s morale. 19 From the 
date of Nabob’s commissioning her 
complement had been a mixed 
company of British and Canadian 
sailors. The greatest area of friction 
was the differing scale of victualling 
between Royal Navy and Royal 
Canadian Navy standards. The 
general messing standards in the 
RN were considerably lower, both 
in quantity and quality, a fact which 
caused morale problems amongst 
the ship’s company. Compounding 
the problem was the lack of adequate 
facilities – recreational, shower, and 
mess deck space – and problems 
of overcrowding. In addition, RN 
ratings were paid at a lower rate than 
their counterparts in the Canadian 
navy. All of these factors reduced 
both efficiency and morale.20 Captain 
Lay had been requesting assistance 
since December 1943, but to no 
avail. He therefore recommended 
that “victualling for the whole ship 
should be based on the RCN scale, 
if necessary becoming a Canadian 
commitment; that all allowances for 
RCN personnel should be at Canadian 
rates and that all RN ratings should 
receive the difference of pay between 
RN and RCN rates, if necessary this 
being a commitment of the Canadian 
navy.”21 He also requested that the 
ship be known as HMCS Nabob. This 
last recommendation, unfortunately, 
was not acted upon.
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8 The  Admira l ty  was  qui te 
anxious to resolve the problems. As 
the director of personnel services 
observed: “if Canada had not come 
to the rescue over Nabob and Puncher 
[the second carrier that the RCN 
would crew, which commissioned 
in February 1944], the manning 
situation would have been far more 
difficult. I hope, therefore, that a 
way can be found to get round the 
messing and pay difficulties.”22 
 There were those who felt that 
if the situation was not rectified 
the whole project of Canadians 
manning escort carriers might have 
to be abandoned. As a result of Lay’s 
efforts and ongoing negotiations 
between NSHQ, the British Admiralty 
Maintenance Representative, and the 
Admiralty, a signal was sent on 6 
April 1944, stating that:
(a) All personnel other than 
Fleet Air Arm to be paid pay and 
allowances at Canadian rates. 
Royal Navy personnel regarded 
on loan to Royal Canadian Navy.
(b) S c a l e  a n d  s y s t e m  o f 
victualling in Nabob as in Royal 
Canadian Navy.
(c) (a) and (b) to be charged to 
Royal Canadian Navy effective 15 
March 1944.23
 Nabob sailed for New York on 
18 March 1944, with a much more 
contented ship’s company as a result 
of the new agreement. Once again 852 
Squadron was given the opportunity 
to conduct flying exercises and anti-
submarine patrols while en route. 
The following day the carrier arrived 
in New York and secured alongside 
No.13 Pier at Staten Island where the 
squadron’s 12 aircraft were struck 
below in the hangar to make room for 
45 P-51 Mustang fighters which were 
embarked and lashed securely on 
the flight deck for transportation to 
Great Britain. With the preparations 
complete, Nabob sailed on 23 March 
with convoy UT 10 bound for the 
United Kingdom.
 The convoy consisted of 26 ships, 
under a strong escort of 12 destroyers 
and the escort oiler USS Chemig 
led by the US cruiser Cincinnati in 
which sailed Captain D.F. Worth, 
USN, commander task force 68 and 
senior officer of the escort. With 
Nabob’s squadron struck below she 
was non-operational and took up a 
position in the convoy. The passage 
was uneventful except for two days 
when a gale forced the convoy to 
alter course for a short period. Several 
asdic and high-frequency direction-
finding contacts by the escorts did not 
turn up any U-boats. 
 When Nabob reached Liverpool 
in northern England on 5 April, she 
made several unsuccessful attempts 
to dock in fog. With assistance of tugs, 
she was then able to secure alongside 
Gladstone Dock and disembark 
the American fighter aircraft. The 
following day, she proceeded to 
Greenock, Scotland. During that 
passage, seven Avengers from 852 
Squadron were launched and flown 
to the RN air station at Machrihanish. 
The remainder of the squadron’s 
aircraft were catapulted off while the 
carrier was anchored at the Tail-of-
the-Bank, Greenock, and joined the 
rest of the squadron at Machrihanish. 
Nabob then returned to Liverpool 
for further modifications and refit, 
which began immediately upon 
her arrival on 17 April. The work, 
undertaken by Messrs. Harland 
and Woolf, included the completion 
of her flight deck, installation of 
wireless, high-frequency direction-
finding equipment, and radar as 
well as construction of an aircraft 
direction room, the replacement of 
all 20 Mark IV Oerlikon mountings 
on the forecastle and flight deck, 
the replacement of six Mark IV 
Oerlikon mountings on the lower 
sponsons with Mark VII mountings, 
and completion of the darkened ship 
arrangements.24
 Every opportunity was taken 
to send officers and ratings ashore 
for courses. These included aircraft 
recognition at HMS Queen Charlotte, 
damage control, fire fighting, fighter 
direction (at Yeovilton), and a 
plotting course (at HMS Dryad). 
In addition, the personnel of 852 
Squadron carried out courses and 
exercises at the Machrihanish air 
station. Nabob was also paid several 
ceremonial visits, including one by 
Vice-Admiral P.W. Nelles, who was 
now senior Canadian flag officer 
(overseas) on 21 April 1944. Admiral 
Sir Max Horton, commander-in-chief, 
Western Approaches, later paid an 
informal visit.
 During the week 9 to 16 June, 
as Nabob neared completion, she 
embarked stores and ammunition, 
fuelled, and the crew throughly 
cleaned ship. On 17 June, eight days 
behind schedule, Nabob prepared for 
an intensive work-up program which 
lasted until the end of July. Most of the 
work-ups were conducted from the 
Clyde and Belfast, Northern Ireland, 
and included catapult trials, flying 
exercises, high angle 40 mm Bofors 
shoot, high-frequency direction-
finding calibration and navigation 
exercises. In addition, she conducted 
anti-submarine detection exercises 
with the training ship HMS Philante, 
anti-submarine patrols, night deck 
landings, and oiling at sea with the 
RN frigate Bamborough Castle.25
 Poor weather continued to plague 
the carrier’s program. According to 
Captain Lay, “out of the 17 nights 
allocated for night flying the entire 
programme had to be cancelled on six 
nights and curtailed on three others. 
As regards day flying, out of the 18 
days allocated [the] full programme 
took place on only nine days and 
was curtailed on four.” To make 
matters worse, Nabob was beset with 
mechanical difficulties. On 8 July 
problems with the main feed pump 
for the engine forced her to return to 
Greenock until 14 July. On 24 July the 
main circulating pump began acting 
up and forced the carrier to return to 
the Naval Air Wharf, Belfast, to effect 
repairs until 28 July.
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9 Despite these problems there 
had been a marked improvement 
in the ship’s morale ever since she 
had left Norfolk. Nevertheless, in 
Captain Lay’s opinion, “the squadron 
and ship’s air staff personnel [had] 
not produced a smooth running 
organization, and as a result there 
[had] been too many delays in take-
offs, too many unserviceable aircraft, 
and too many failures in armament.”26 
This did not bode well for the future. 
One source of difficulty was the high 
turnover in officers and ratings. 
In the first six months of Nabob’s 
commission “seventy-one officers 
exclusive of air squadron personnel 
joined the ship. The total officer 
complement was forty-one and had 
already been completely turned over 
by the substitution of Canadian for 
British officers.”27 These frequent 
changes in personnel did nothing for 
the morale or the operating efficiency 
of the ship’s company. In fact, Lay 
had to get rid of two executive 
officers and he regarded the third as 
“inefficient.”28 As well, a number of 
the key RN officers who stood by the 
ship while she was being modified 
and who might have compensated for 
the executive officers’ weakness left 
ship shortly after the RCN personnel 
arrived.29 In July another 28 ratings 
(17 RN and 11 RCN) were discharged 
by the Admiralty and NSHQ while 
16 RN and 32 RCN ratings joined 
the ship. The appointment of a new 
commander (flying), Lieutenant-
Commander H.J .H.  Stephens, 
RN, would, it was hoped (by the 
Admiralty and Lay), address the 
problems on the air side at least. 
Lay’s impression of the air side was 
confirmed by the flag officer carrier 
training, Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur 
L. St. G. Lyster, who after visiting 
Nabob on 21 July 1944 reported to 
the Admiralty that he “was not at all 
satisfied with [the ship’s company’s] 
progress. [The] state of serviceability 
of aircraft, functioning of weapons 
and depth charges were all below 
an acceptable standard for an 
operational carrier.” Following his 
inspection of the ship Admiral Lyster 
had the opportunity to address the 
ship’s company and make his feelings 
known. This blunt assessment seems 
to have encouraged the crew in 
harder training under Stephens, the 
new commander (flying).30 
 The gunnery crews were also 
having some problems. On 14 July, 
for example, one Oerlikon gunnery 
crew shot away four wireless aerials 
during the first round. The crews 
also experienced a power failure 
just two minutes before the first 
round was due to commence. As a 
result, Oerlikon firings were layed 
and trained by hand. The Bofors 
firings were obstructed by ships 
and aircraft, and some groups – no.2 
and no.5 – were not able to fire as 
many rounds as the other crews. 
Despite these particular problems 
the performance of the crews was 
considered satisfactory.31 
 Nabob’s training program ended 
on 30 July 1944, when she returned 
to the Tail-of-the-Bank, off Greenock. 
The following day, the escort carrier 
left the Scottish anchorage in company 
with a sister ship, HMS Trumpeter, 
in preparation for operational 
duties. On passing the boom gate 
Church parade on the flight deck of HMS Nabob, January 1944.
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10
at Scapa Flow both ships joined 
the Home Fleet and were placed 
under the administrative orders 
of Rear-Admiral R.R. McGrigor, 
commanding First Cruiser Squadron.
 Canadian naval authorities had 
hoped that Nabob would be operating 
in support of the Canadian escort 
groups assigned to the Mid-Ocean 
Escort Force in the North Atlantic. 
There was every indication that this 
would be the case. During the course 
of her work-up program she had 
carried out anti-submarine detection 
exercises as well as air support group 
exercises in preparation for trade 
protection duties. As early as April 
1944, Nabob had been designated 
for trade escort duties under the 
orders of the commander-in-chief, 
Western Approaches.32 Admiral 
Nelles, following his visit to the 
ship, reported that Captain Lay had 
been informed by the flag officer 
carrier training that “Nabob would 
be allocated to the North Atlantic 
convoy protection service, [although] 
it seem[ed] probable that the ship 
[would] operate in conjunction 
with support ships, and [would] be 
based in a United Kingdom port.”33 
Two months later, on 19 June 1944, 
Lay proposed that a group of five 
Canadian destroyers or frigates be 
allocated to form, with Nabob, the 
first Royal Canadian Navy carrier 
support group.34 Subsequent to 
Lay’s request, NSHQ informed the 
Admiralty that six frigates were 
working up at Bermuda and would 
be ready for operations at the end of 
July. The frigates were to be used as a 
support force in the Western Atlantic 
under the operational control of 
the commander-in-chief, Canadian 
Northwest Atlantic, Rear-Admiral 
L.W. Murray, RCN, at Halifax. 
In order to complete the support 
group Naval Service Headquarters 
requested that Nabob be placed 
under the operational control of 
Canadian authorities.35 (Lay had 
proposed something similar as early 
as January 1943 when he was the 
director of the operations division. 
In his memorandum to the vice-
chief and chief of the naval staff, Lay 
pointed out that “if the RCN wished 
to provide adequate escort for mid-
ocean convoys, [it] must have, and be 
able to man,…aircraft carriers for at 
least its mid-ocean groups.”36) 
 In the event, circumstances 
prevented Nabob from seeing service 
with a Canadian support group. 
Firstly, the operation of a carrier 
group under Canadian control in the 
western Atlantic would require new 
supporting base facilities at Halifax, 
whose existing facilities were already 
over-taxed. That was an argument for 
the group to operate in the central 
and eastern ocean under Western 
Approaches Command, which 
had the necessary facilities. More 
important, the Admiralty was faced 
with the following commitments: 
maintenance of the offensive in the 
English Channel until the German 
U-boats abandoned their attempts to 
interfere with Operation Overlord; 
provision of escorts for the Russian 
convoys, and reorganization of 
the ocean escort groups in order 
to permit a reduction in the size of 
the trans-Atlantic convoys during 
the forthcoming winter.37 From the 
British perspective, the Admiralty 
“could not afford the manning 
of a support group chasing the 
odd U-boat on the west side of the 
Atlantic”38 regardless of the group’s 
value in the future. The disposition of 
German U-boats warranted Nabob’s 
stationing in British home waters, 
and the Admiralty did not take kindly 
to Canadian attempts to assert their 
autonomy in operational matters, 
despite the fact that Canada was in 
charge of an alliance operational 
theatre  of  war,  the Canadian 
Northwest Atlantic area, for the 
first time in its history. This attitude 
was perhaps best illustrated by an 
unidentified British officer who 
asserted, “I do not like Naval Service 
Headquarters proposal [to place an 
escort carrier under the operational 
control of the commander-in-chief, 
Canadian Northwest Atlantic] 
because it implies the intention to 
operate the group independently.”39 
As late as 11 July, the Admiralty was 
still not certain whether Nabob would 
be stationed in the Mediterranean or 
with the Home Fleet. However, by 22 
July, the Admiralty was requesting 
that the support group operate either 
with the North Russian convoys or 
in the English Channel. As Nabob 
was still a British ship, Canada 
An Avenger lands on board an escort 
carrier.
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was obliged to acquiesce to British 
requests.
 Nabob arrived at Scapa Flow, the 
main base of the British Home Fleet 
in the Orkney Islands to the north 
of Scotland, on 1 August 1944. She 
spent the next eight days preparing 
for operations, including two days 
of flying training in the practice area 
west of the Orkneys in company with 
one of the British fleet destroyers 
taken over by the RCN, HMCS 
Algonquin. The impending Operation 
Offspring was designed to force 
German shipping – both merchant 
and naval – out of the Norwegian 
leads between the coast and outlying 
islands by laying mines.40 This 
interdiction of the protected inshore 
routes would force shipping out into 
open water where they could more 
readily be detected and attacked by 
RAF Coastal Command de Havilland 
Mosquito and Bristol Beaufighters 
flying from northern Scotland.
 “ F o r c e  4 ”  a s s e m b l e d  f o r 
Operation Offspring consisted of a 
fleet carrier, HMS Indefatigable, two 
escort carriers, Nabob and Trumpeter, 
the cruisers Kent and Devonshire, 
and the 26th Destroyer Flotilla, 
HMS Myngs ,  Verulam ,  Vigilant , 
Virago, Volage and Scourge along 
with HMCS Algonquin and Sioux, a 
second British fleet destroyer that 
had been transferred to the RCN.41 
Nabob sailed on 8 August 1944, in 
preparation for a full-scale rehearsal 
of the operation, launching all twelve 
of her Avengers that afternoon. 
The following day the force shaped 
course for the Norwegian coast. It 
was planned to launch two strikes 
of Avenger aircraft. The first wave, 
consisting of 24 planes, would be 
flown off Trumpeter and Nabob, lay 
their mines, return to the carriers 
to refuel and re-arm and launch a 
second strike, to sew a total of 48 
mines. The fighters from Indefatigable 
were to provide close escort for the 
Avengers against enemy fighters as 
well as carry out secondary attacks 
against suitable targets such as anti-
aircraft batteries and radar stations, 
while a group of Supermarine Seafires 
attacked Gossen airfield nearby. The 
Grumman Wildcat fighters from 
Nabob would provide top-cover 
(combat air patrol) for the fleet 
throughout the entire operation.42
 On 10 August 1944, the force 
reached the flying-off position but 
could not launch the aircraft until 
1300 hours because of poor weather. 
The first attack nevertheless caught 
the Germans totally off guard. 
“Six Messerschmidt 110’s were 
destroyed on the ground at Gossen 
airfield, hangers and warehouses, 
and an oil tank were set on fire and 
the 90-ton minesweeper R89 was 
sunk.”43 All aircraft had returned 
from the first strike by 1430 hours 
with only minimal damage to one 
or two of the fighters. The Avengers 
of 852 Squadron could not land 
immediately however. Just as the 
squadron was returning, one of the 
destroyers picked up an asdic contact 
dead ahead of Nabob. “The rudder 
was put hard over in an emergency 
turn and the planes had to continue 
circling until the carrier could resume 
the landing-on course.” Once the 
aircraft landed they were checked 
for damage, fuelled and re-armed in 
preparation for the second strike.
 The second wave took off at 1800 
hours with all aircraft airborne by 
1815 hours. The Germans were better 
prepared for the second attack, and 
anti-aircraft fire was both heavy and 
accurate in the Lepsorev Channel 
area. The 12 Avengers from Nabob 
“had the less dangerous task than 
those from Trumpeter as the outer 
end of Haarhams-fjord was not 
defended by anti-aircraft batteries 
as was Lepsorev Channel.”44 Despite 
stiffening German resistance all 24 
mines were sown successfully and 
the aircraft returned to the carriers 
by 1945 hours. Having successfully 
completed the mission, Force 4 
withdrew and headed for home. 
The force had lost one Avenger from 
Trumpeter, and one Fairey Firefly 
and three Seafires from Indefatigable. 
Operation Offspring was the largest 
Home Fleet carrier minelaying 
operation of the war.
 On completion of the operation, 
Nabob and Trumpeter were detached 
from Force 4 at 1900 hours on 11 
August 1944, in Pentalyn Firth and 
ordered to proceed to Rosyth, to 
embark a special type of mine which 
was to be used in their next sortie 
with the Home Fleet.45 Both ships 
then weighed anchor shortly after 
midnight on 13 August, bound 
for Scapa Flow. From 14 August 
through 17 August, the carrier once 
again conducted flying exercises in 
the practice area west of the Orkney 
Islands in preparation for Operation 
Goodwood – the largest operation by 
the Home Fleet’s air arm of the war. 
The operation was to be a repeat of 
Operation Tungsten, the Fleet Air 
Arm’s attack against the battleship 
Tirpitz on 3 April 1944. The German 
battleship had seriously limited the 
scope of operations of the British 
Home Fleet since January 1942. 
Simply by positioning herself in the 
Norwegian fjords, she had become 
a “fleet in being.” The British were 
forced to devote a large proportion of 
their naval resources to prevent her 
from breaking out into the Atlantic or 
raiding convoys bound for Russia. For 
their part, the Germans believed that 
Tirpitz also provided some measure 
of security against a potential Allied 
invasion of Norway.46
 The purpose of  Operation 
Goodwood was to immobilize Tirpitz 
prior to the recommencement of the 
Arctic convoys. The Admiralty’s 
assessment of the situation was that 
by “June [Tirpitz] would be capable 
of ‘limited operations’; and, quite 
apart from the need to safeguard the 
Arctic convoys, it was impossible to 
carry out the strengthening of the 
Eastern Fleet [British Pacific Fleet] at 
the expense of the Home Fleet any 
further until the Tirpitz had been sunk 
or permanently put out of action.”47 
Operation Mascot, which was carried 
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out on 17 July 1944, was designed 
to do just that. Unfortunately, the 
Germans were prepared and put 
up an effective smoke-screen which 
prevented Fleet Air Arm aircraft from 
finding their target. Consequently, 
Operation Goodwood was planned 
for 22-29 August.
 Goodwood was timed to coincide 
with the passage of convoys JW 59 
and RA 59A, just as Tungsten had 
been timed to cover the passage of 
JW 58 and RA 58, four months earlier. 
This would ensure that the convoys 
would be protected from Tirpitz and 
the convoys could be used to lure 
U-boats operating in northern waters 
away from the precious aircraft 
carriers. In addition, there would be 
diversionary attacks on Hammerfest 
and Banak airfield.
 The attack on Tirpitz was to be 
carried out by three Fairey Barracuda 
squadrons from the fleet carriers 
HMS Indefatigable, Formidable and 
Furious. Two squadrons of Avengers 
from HM Ships Nabob and Trumpeter 
were to lay special mines near the 
German battleship, while fighter 
aircraft carried out strafing runs on 
Hammerfest and Banak. The fleet 
was divided into two separate forces. 
Force 1 under the commander-in-chief 
Home Fleet in the battleship HMS 
Duke of York included the three fleet 
carriers, the cruisers HMS Berwick 
and Devonshire and 13 destroyers, 
among them HMCS Algonquin and 
Sioux. Force 2 comprised the escort 
carriers Nabob and Trumpeter, the 
cruiser Kent, and the five Captain 
class frigates of the 5th Escort Group, 
whose senior officer was in HMS 
Bickerton. In support was Force 
9 – two oilers with four escorting 
corvettes.
 Nabob weighed anchor on 18 
August 1944 and cleared the boom 
defences at Scapa Flow in company 
with Trumpeter. Force 2, consisting 
of Nabob (guide of the fleet for Force 
2) with Trumpeter astern and the 5th 
Escort Group acting as a screen for 
the carriers proceeded at 17 knots for 
Norway. Force 1 maintained visual 
signalling distance with Force 2 for 
the duration of the passage, reaching 
the flying-off position in the Arctic 
Circle north of Tromso on 20 August. 
That afternoon Nabob’s 14 Avengers 
were armed and ranged on the flight 
deck in preparation for the first 
strike.48 At approximately 2200 hours, 
Nabob was informed by the 
commander-in-chief, Home 
Fleet, that the operation 
h a d  b e e n  p o s t p o n e d 
unti l  22 August  owing 
to deteriorating weather 
conditions in the area. The 
HMS Nabob participated in 
Operation Goodwood in late 
August 1944 (not to be confused 
with the land operation of 
the same name in Normandy 
in July 1944) which was an 
attempt to sink or disable the 
German battleship Tirpitz. Since 
January 1942 the Tirpitz had 
negatively impacted British 
fleet operations by acting as a 
“fleet-in-being” from the fjords 
of Norway. This reconnaissance 
photo shows the Tirpitz hidden 
in the Aas Fjord, 9 February 
1942. 
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fleet withdrew to the west to avoid 
contact with the enemy and to refuel 
the escorts. Following refuelling 
the fleet returned to its flying-off 
position in the early hours of 22 
August. Once again, 852 Squadron 
received disappointing news. The 
rear-admiral commanding First 
Cruiser Squadron informed Nabob 
and Trumpeter that the Avenger 
squadrons would not take part in the 
operation on account of poor weather 
conditions. Visibility up to 8,000 feet 
was crucial in order to carry out their 
assigned role:
since the Avengers had to see the 
Barracudas below them in order to 
synchronize their attacks. Since the 
visibility was not sufficiently good 
for this to be done, it was decided 
that the special mines which were to 
be laid around the Tirpitz should not 
be thrown away in an attack made 
under unfavourable conditions.49 
The cancellation of this part of the 
operation was a bitter blow to Nabob’s 
crew, and in particular 852 Squadron, 
which had trained very hard for this 
opportunity. 
 Nevertheless, the carrier still 
had an important role to play in the 
operation and when the bugle call for 
action stations sounded at 1100 hours 
the four Wildcat fighters were fuelled 
and ranged on the deck in preparation 
for their launching. At 1225 hours, the 
fighters were launched from Nabob’s 
deck to provide top-cover for the 
rest of the fleet. In the meantime, 
32 Barracudas, 24 Chance-Vought 
Corsairs, 11 Fairey Fireflies, nine 
Grumman Hellcat fighter-bombers, 
and eight Seafires (of Indefatigable’s 
No.24 Fighter Wing) formed up and 
headed for Tirpitz. However, solid 
cloud cover at 1,500 feet forced the 
Barracudas and Corsairs to return to 
their carriers. The Seafires continued 
on course for Banak airfield and the 
Kolvick seaplane base, while the 
Fireflies and Hellcats attacked the 
German battleship.50 Despite the 
fact that the Germans were caught 
unaware, no hits were registered on 
the massive ship. The only damage 
inflicted was the destruction of 
Tirpitz’s two AR 196As aircraft; a 
U-boat (U-965) at Hammerfest and 
the seaplane anchorage at Bukta were 
strafed.
 Meanwhile Nabob’s four Wildcat 
fighters continued to provide air 
cover for the fleet until 1504 hours 
when they were landed back on 
board the carrier. At 1530 hours 
action stations were secured and 
defence stations closed up, and HM 
Ships Kent, Trumpeter, Nabob, and 
the 5th Escort Group were detached 
westward with instructions to refuel 
the destroyer escorts. The Canadian-
manned carrier was tasked to fuel 
three destroyers, commencing at 
1800 hours, while Trumpeter’s aircraft 
carried out anti-submarine patrols in 
the immediate vicinity. The weather 
was clear with good visibility up 
to 20 miles and the sea was slight 
and the swell moderate – perfect 
conditions for Trumpeter’s aircraft 
on the lookout for German U-boats 
which might be operating in the 
area. Nabob’s flight deck had been 
cleared of aircraft and the crew was 
in middle of preparing the buoyant 
hose for refuelling, when at 1716 
hours the carrier was torpedoed 
on the starboard side aft by U-354, 
ripping a hole 32 feet in diameter in 
the ship’s side below the waterline. 
At the time of her torpedoing, Nabob 
was approximately 100 nautical miles 
northwest of Alten Fjord and had 
been on a zig-zag course.51
 N a b o b ’ s  e l e c t r i c a l  p o w e r 
immediately failed as a result of the 
torpedoing. This, in turn, caused 
all the auxiliary machinery in the 
engine room to fail. Within two 
minutes the main engines had shut 
down and the temperature in the 
engine room climbed rapidly to 150 
degrees as the ventilation fans ceased 
to function. Immediately after the 
torpedo struck, “the ship rapidly 
trimmed down by fourteen feet by the 
stern to a draught of thirty-eight feet 
and took [on] a seven-degree list, her 
draught finally increasing to forty-
two feet.”52 The compartments in the 
immediate vicinity of the damage 
were evacuated and the hatches 
An aerial view of HMS Nabob with its stern low in 
the war shortly after being torpedoed by U-354, 22 
August 1944.
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were closed, but the large horizontal 
hatches throughout the ship were not 
watertight. Consequently, the ship 
flooded up to the galley deck, just 
below the main hanger deck. Due 
to the rapidity of the stern settling, 
“it first appeared as if Nabob would 
sink quickly, and all boats, carley 
floats, and rafts, were put over the 
side and the ship’s company ordered 
to prepare to abandon ship.”53 At 
1815 hours, almost an hour after 
the torpedo struck, 214 ratings and 
ten injured men were transferred 
to HMS Kempthorne. Most of the 
injuries had occurred in and around 
the spirit room where the rum issue 
was being dispensed at the time of 
the attack. The explosion destroyed 
or put out of action the “main galley, 
bakery, vegetable preparing room, 
scullery, all refrigerators, provision 
room, main provision stores, and 
some of the crews’ berthing and 
sleeping areas. In addition, several 
other compartments including the 
messing assembly, powder and bomb 
storage areas were rendered useless 
due to flooding.”54 Damage control 
parties immediately began the task 
of shoring up bulkheads and the 
decks with timber already stored 
aboard the carrier. By 1850 hours it 
was reported that the engine room 
bulkhead was holding and that the 
engines, propeller shaft, and the 
propeller were undamaged, and 
that it would be possible to make the 
necessary repairs to get underway.
 In the meantime, all unnecessary 
weight was being jettisoned from 
Nabob, including ammunition, depth 
charges, even the 5-inch guns were 
dismantled and thrown overboard. 
The aircraft handling party moved 
all the aircraft in the hangar as far 
forward and to port as possible to 
counteract the list of the ship and to 
raise the stern. “None of the escorts 
had been in asdic contact with a 
U-boat and it was presumed that 
she had been hit by a ‘Gnat’ torpedo 
fired at extreme range.”55 While 
conducting a search for the U-boat, 
Top: Personnel line the port side of the flight deck of HMS Nabob shortly after 
the ship was torpedoed.
Middle: HMS Kempthorne moves in close to the damaged escort carrier to facilitate 
the transfer of casualties.
Bottom: Survivors from HMS Nabob being transferred to the Canadian destroyer 
HMCS Algonquin.
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HMS Bickerton was torpedoed at 
1724 hours, the stern of the frigate 
being blown off and more than forty 
men killed in the explosion.56 The 
frigate was eventually scuttled with 
a torpedo from HMS Vigilant. At the 
time time of the attack, HM Ships 
Kempthorne, Vigilante, Alymer, and 
Bligh were in the area, and Kempthorne 
was immediately detached to pick up 
all the remaining survivors while the 
remainder of the ships conducted a 
search, but to no avail.57
 By 1900 hours flooding was under 
control and one hour later Nabob’s 
engine room began to raise steam in 
preparation for getting underway. 
At the same time preparations were 
under way to transfer 173 men of 852 
Squadron to the attending destroyers, 
leaving onboard the squadron’s air 
staff officers. Finally, after more than 
three hours of frenzied work by the 
ship’s company the carrier gathered 
way and shaped course for Scapa 
Flow at six knots. For the passage 
home, she was escorted by HM Ships 
Kempthorne, Aylmer and Bligh. 
 The carrier and her escorts 
obtained a series of high-frequency/
direction-finding contacts which 
indicated that a U-boat was following 
astern. By 0230 hours, 23 August, 
the submarine had closed to 3,600 
yards and it was necessary to alter 
course in order to put more distance 
between the stricken carrier and 
the U-boat. Surprisingly, Nabob 
was able to launch two Avengers 
off her sloping flight deck to chase 
the submarine off. Although the 
U-boat was never sighted credit was 
given to the aircrews for keeping the 
U-boat submerged, thereby giving 
Nabob the opportunity to make 
good her escape. After providing 
anti-submarine patrols for three-
and-a-half hours, the Avenger pilots 
had to face the dangerous task of 
landing on the canted flight deck. 
Landing on an escort carrier’s flight 
deck was daunting under the best 
of conditions. The first Avenger 
landed aboard without incident. 
The second aircraft, however, was 
not so fortunate. Weather conditions 
were deteriorating and the ship’s 
movement caused the plane to crash 
into the barrier damaging six aircraft 
ranged on the forward part of the 
flight deck. As a result, two Avengers 
were seriously damaged – and were 
subsequently jettisoned – while the 
other two Avengers and two Wildcats 
were slightly damaged.58 Later that 
day, 23 August, the carrier was joined 
by HMS Keats, HMCS Algonquin, 
and HMS Trumpeter who followed 
astern and provided air escort. Lay 
transferred another 202 ratings and 
the ship’s chaplain to Algonquin. 
Shoring up operations continued 
throughout the rest of the passage 
as did the jettisoning of unnecessary 
equipment further to reduce the 
draught.
 By 24 August the weather was 
deteriorating rapidly and the carrier 
found herself in the middle of a gale. 
According to Captain Lay’s report 
the “sea was steep the swells were 
short.”59 The gale buffeted the carrier 
for eleven hours, but the ship was able 
to remain on course and maintain a 
speed of ten knots. Fortunately for 
Nabob the bulkheads and shoring 
HMS Nabob in drydock showing the 32-foot hole caused by the torpedo strike.
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held. By the following day the sea 
had moderated and although several 
HF/DF bearings were obtained, 
they turned out to be false alarms. 
As Nabob approached British waters 
additional air cover was provided 
for the stricken carrier by shore-
based Consolidated Catalinas and 
Short Sunderland flying boats, 
which provided cover for two days. 
Meanwhile, Trumpeter continued to 
fly anti-submarine patrols. Nabob 
finally limped into Scapa Flow on 
27 August and secured alongside, 
having covered 1,093 miles in four 
days and five nights. It was a miracle 
that she had made it all.
 Indeed, in the words of Rear-
Admiral R.R. McGrigor, commanding 
First Cruiser Squadron, 
“looking at her from 
a distance of seven 
miles I never expected 
her to survive.”60 That 
Nabob  d id  surv ive 
c a n  b e  a t t r i b u t e d 
to  severa l  fac tors . 
Firstly, the extensive 
modifications carried 
out by Burrard Drydock 
a n d  S h i p b u i l d i n g 
Company, to Royal 
Navy standards, in all 
likelihood prevented 
a serious aviation gas 
or  bomb magazine 
explosion of the kind 
t h a t  h a d  d o o m e d 
earlier escort carriers. 
Secondly, exemplary 
work was carried out 
by the ship’s company, 
particularly the damage 
control and electrical 
parties, engine room 
personnel  and the 
aircraft handling parties 
who all contributed to 
the common cause.61 
Finally, according to 
Captain Lay, Nabob was 
particularly fortunate 
in having more than 
i ts  share  of  heavy 
timber, used for repair and shoring 
operations: “very little timber is 
allowed to United States Navy ships 
of the same type by the Bureau of 
Ships and it cannot be doubted that 
a United States ship under the same 
circumstances would almost certainly 
have lost many of the bulkheads 
saved in Nabob by quick shoring.”62 
In Nabob’s case the lengthy delays 
in “Anglicizing” the ship probably 
prevented heavy loss of life.
 As it was, eleven RCN and ten 
RN ratings were killed or missing 
as a result of the explosion with 
a further five RCN and one RN 
ratings injured. Indeed, the whole 
Tirpitz operation was disappointing. 
Besides the loss of HM Ships Nabob 
and Bickerton, the Fleet Air Arm lost 
one Barracuda and ten fighters in 
the 242 sorties launched against the 
German battleship. This figure does 
not include the six aircraft damaged 
on Nabob. Despite a direct hit with a 
1,600 pound armour piercing bomb 
– which failed to explode – and 
another hit with a 500 pound bomb, 
only superficial damage was inflicted 
on the Tirpitz. Norman Polmar has 
argued that Operation Goodwood 
was “the most striking failure of the 
Fleet Air Arm during World War II”63 
for failing to sink the great battleship. 
He attributes the failure directly 
to the poor performance of the 
Barracuda aircraft in terms of speed 
and bomb-load. He failed, however, 
to take into account the mitigating 
factors: poor weather conditions, the 
withdrawal of two escort carriers and 
their twenty-four Avenger aircraft, 
and the determined resistance of 
the Germans. While Operation 
Goodwood failed to achieve its 
primary objective, the sinking of 
Tirpitz, it did achieve its secondary 
goal, the demobilization – albeit brief 
– of the ship. Damage to the deck and 
superstructure, casualties amongst 
the crew, and the diminution of her 
ammunition stocks resulted in the 
German battleship being temporarily 
rendered non-operational. Insofar 
as Nabob was concerned, she was 
avenged on 23 August 1944, when 
aircraft operating from HMS Vindex 
sank U-354.
 HMS Nabob certainly would 
have been repaired and put back into 
service if sentiment had prevailed, 
but her damage was so extensive and 
the British yards so overcrowded that 
the Admiralty decided to cannibalize 
her to provide parts for other ships.64 
Had Nabob not been damaged, she 
would have been used in an air 
support role providing distant 
cover for the Russian convoy JW 
59. This role would have been more 
in line with the training that she 
received during her intensive work 
up program. Whether she would 
Captain Lay (left) with Admiral Sir Henry R. Moore on board 
HMS Nabob to inspect the damage, 3 September 1944. It is 
remarkable that the ship was able to survive such massive 
damage, but Royal Navy standards along with the exemplary 
work of the ship’s damage control parties combined to save 
the ship.
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have ever come under Canadian 
operational control and operated in 
the western Atlantic, however, is 
doubtful since all attempts to have 
her commissioned as a Canadian 
warship failed. Nabob remained at 
Scapa Flow until 8 September 1944, 
when she proceeded to Rosyth 
where she was destored and paid 
off on 30 September of that same 
year. Although Nabob had been in 
commission for just a little over one 
year and had taken part in only two 
operations – in which she was used 
as a fleet carrier – she deserves an 
honourable place in Canadian naval 
history for her valuable contribution 
to a fledgling Canadian naval air 
arm, this despite the fact that Nabob 
remained an HM Ship throughout 
her commission. The manning of 
HMS Nabob provided Canadians 
with experience in the operation of 
this class of vessel and would prove 
invaluable when the time came 
to operate the light fleet carriers 
that Canada acquired from Great 
Britain following the end of the 
war. For Nabob’s part in Operation 
Goodwood she received “Tirpitz” 
as a battle honour. With the paying 
off of Nabob, Canadian personnel 
were left manning only one escort 
carrier – HMS Puncher, which, after 
ferrying aircraft in the latter part of 
1944, joined the British Home Fleet 
for northern operations. She, too, 
received a battle honour, “Norway 
1945.”
 By war’s end, fifty-five officers 
of  the RCN and RCNVR had 
undergone training as pilots and 
observers with the Fleet Air Arm. 
Also, approximately 225 men were 
undergoing training as air fitters and 
air mechanics. In addition, twenty-
five ratings with sea experience had 
trained training as naval air gunners. 
Finally, approximately 600 ratings 
were “infiltrated” into RN carrier 
crews to gain experience in light fleet 
carriers prior to Canada’s acquisition 
of the type. Many of these men would 
serve as the nucleus for Canada’s 
naval air arm in the post-war period. 
Finally, the aforementioned figures 
do not include the more than 1,000 
Canadian personnel who cut their 
teeth in naval aviation serving in 
HMS Nabob and later HMS Puncher.
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